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RECENT CASE NOTES
The statute under consideration itself, by implication, delegates this power.
It will be seen, then, that such a rule laid down by a school corporation is a
"law" within the meaning of the Constitution, for it is legislative in character and is an exercise of delegated power. Therefore, it would be unconstitutional as to existing contracts, as an impairment upon the obligation of
contracts, unless the corporation had the power to exercise police power.
The legislature has the power to delegate police power to administrative
boards and units.8 The statute under consideration itself, by implication,
delegates the power to prescribe reasonable rules for the regulation of
school affairs. Since this is in no way limited, it ought to be construed as
giving to the school corporation the power to make all reasonable rules
that the state itself could make. So construed, there is such a delegation
of the police power that the school corporation could pass a rule within the
scope of such power, even though it would otherwise impair the obligation
of contracts. Under the statute the school authorities could, of course, discharge any teacher who wilfully refused to obey such a rule.
Of course the result reached in the principal case is correct, assuming
that the court was not in error in holding that the rule involved was not a
reasonable one. The defendant could not possibly base its right to dismiss
the plaintiff upon any other cause than "insubordination." Where power
to dismiss for definite causes is expressly delegated to a school corporation,
it cannot dismiss for any other cause.9 It was not contended that the plaintiff was incompetent, immoral, that he neglected his duties, or that there
was a decrease in the number of teaching positions. It is true that the defendant relied to some extent upon the application of the "or for other
good and just cause" provision. But, applying the doctrine of construction
known as ejusdem generis,o this really added nothing to the powers to dismiss expressly given by the statute.
W. H. H.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-OCCUPATIONAL DIsEAsE-The dependents of one, Buenker, were denied compensation, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, where the evidence showed that the decedent had worked as
foreman of the employer's finishing room, where paint was used, and that
he died from metal poisoning as a result of an internal overdose of the
paint. Decedent had not been ill before and no wilfulness, nor expectation
of the poisoning, on the part of the decedent, was proven. Held, that the
death was the result of an "occupational disease" and not an "accident",
since no unusual occurrence on the day of the illness was proven.'
This decision brings into question the proper construction of our Act on
that phrase of the subject. The part of the Act applicable to this discussion
reads: 2 "Every employer and employee, except as herein stated, shall be
presumed to have accepted the provisions of this act respectively to pay
8 Woodruff v. R1.R. Co. (1890),

59 Conn. 63, 20 AtL 17; Relief Electric Light

Company's Petition (1916), 63 Pa. Super. 1; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. -. X. C.
Corp. Comm. (1906), 206 U. S. 1, 27 Su. Ct. 585.
9 School City of Elwooc v. The State ex rel. Griffin (Ind., 1932), 180 N.E. 471;
Kennedy v. San Francisco Bd. of Ed. (1890), 82 Cal. 483, 22 Pac. 1042.
10Yarlott V. Brown (1921), 192 Ind. 648, 138 N. E. 17.
1
Buenker v. Union Furniture Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, June 2, 1932, 181
N. E. 294.
2Burns' Ann. St. Supp. of 1929, Sec. 9447.
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and accept compensation for personal injuries or death by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment. Injury and personal injury
shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment and shall not include a disease in any form except as it shall
result from the injury."3
Does the fact that the decedent's death was the result of an "occupational disease" preclude recovery by the dependents under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Indiana? The answer to this question is the subject
of this case note.
The theory of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as well stated by our
court,4 was the correction of recognized errors and abuses, in that, formerly, only cases attributable to the fault of the employer were compensable by him, whereas the Act is to place the burden on the employer, by
him, to be distributed to the ultimate consumer of his product, of compensating for the economic loss attributable to the employment. In referring
to the construction of the Act, our courts say:5 "It should be liberally construed to the end that the purpose of the Legislature, by suppressing the
mischiefs and advancing the remedy, be promoted, even to the inclusion of
cases within the reason, although outside the letter of the statute."
To ably discuss this case, the requirements of our Compensation Act, as
set forth in the Act itself and as construed by our courts, must be separately defined and applied. The following are the facts, pertinent to this
case, which must appear as a basis for the award of compensation to the
injured employee or his dependents: (a) that the employee receive an injury, (b) that the injury was by accident, (c) that the accident arose out
of the employment, (d) that the accident occurred in the course of the employment, (e)6 if a disease is the alleged disability, it must result from a
factual situation where (a), (b), (c), and (d) exist.
"The word 'injury', as applied to a personal injury to a human being,
includes whatever lesion or change in any part of the system produces
harm or pain, or a lessened facility of the natural uses of any bodily activity or capability." 7 It is submitted that in the Buenker case, the continued
absorption of the metal particles into the decedent's stomach created a
change in that part of his system producing harm from which the disease
resulted, culminating in death. Ergo, it resulted from an injury.
It appears from the cases which deny compensation for occupational disease that they base their decision on the ground that there was no "accident." The decision under discussion omitted the citation of authorities for
its position, but there is authority which could have been cited in support
of the case. For instance, in one case, 8 the court affirmed a denial of compensation where the employee was injured by continually breathing air,
heavy with emery dust. The court said in that case that there was no "accident" because the employee knew the dust was there and knew that that
condition had caused others to become sick; therefore that there was no
3 Burns' Ann. St. Supp. of 1929, Sec. 9518 (d).
4

n re Duncan (1920), 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N. E. 289.

5In re Duncan (1920), 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N. E. 289.
6Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1929, Sec. 9518 (d).
7 Wasmuth-Bndicott Co. v. Harat (1922), 77 Ind. App. 279, 133 N. E. 609.
$Moore v. Service Motor Truck Co. (1924), 80 Ind. App. 668, 142 N. E. 19.
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9
unusual occurrence which could be called an "accident." In another case,
our court affirmed a denial of compensation where the decedent was injured
by the inhalation of gas and smoke, and where he .had worked under the
same conditions for almost a year and knew they had caused others to
become sick. Again it was said that there was no "accident," as there was
no unusual occurrence, since the decedent knew of the conditions under
which he was working. To the writer, this kind of reasoning seems to be a
reversion, in a poorly disguised form, to the common law tort doctrine of
denial of recovery because of plaintiff's voluntary assumption of the risk,
to rid our law of which was the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. What then is the correct interpretation of the word "accident," as
used in our Act? Our court has defined the term,' 0 saying, "The word
'accident' is used in its popular sense and means any mishap or untoward
event not expected and not designed by the one who suffered the injury or
death." In the above quotation the writer italicized what to him is the
important part of the definition, it being the part which seems to have
been overlooked by the decisions denying recovery for occupational disease
on the ground that there was no "accident." These cases deny recovery
because the employee knew of the conditions under which he worked, without discussing the question of whether the employee expected or designed the
injury or death. They confuse the means and the end. It is the end, not the
means, which must be looked to in answer of the question, "Was there an
accident"? A well reasoned Indiana case, 11 in allowing recovery, says:
"While it appears that the decedent had been afflicted by the poisonous gas
before, it is apparent that he did not anticipate or design the serious consequences resulting in his death. Yet the evidence abundantly justifies the
inference that the immediate cause of the death was the injury by the
inhalation of the noxious gas." It continues, holding thelinjury to be by
accident, saying, "an injury may be the result of accidental means though
the act involving the accident was intentional."12 Illustrating, could it be
said that one, intending to drink water, drank poison and died as a result,
did not die by accident. There, the act was intended, but the consequence
was not at all anticipated or designed. Likewise, in the Buenker and similar cases, the act-working under conditions conducive to the development
of disease-was intended, but in the absence of evidence showing that the
deceased expected or designed the disease and resultant death (as in the
Buenker case), the consequence was neither intended nor designed and it
follows that the disease and ultimate death were a result of an injury "by
accident," and therefore compensable if it arose out of and in the course
of the employment.
"An accident is said to arise out of the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon a consideration of all the circumstances,
a casual connection between the conditions under which the work was required to be performed and the resulting injury.13 The very nature of an

9Brewer v. Veedersburg Paver Co. (1932), 92 Ind. App. 547, 177 N. E. 74.
1OFurst Herber Cut Stores Co. v. Mayo (1924), 32 Ind. App. 363, 144 N. E. 857.
1General American, eto., Corporation v. Weirick et al. (1921), 77 Ind. App. 242,
133 N. E. 391.
"See also United States Casualty Co. v. Griffis (1917), 186 Ind. 126, 114 N.
E. 83.
isSltthv. Leslie et al. (1926), 85 Ind. App. 186, 151 N. E. 17.
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"occupational disease" satisfies this test and there was no contention in the
Buenker case that the "casual connection" requirement was not satisfied.
"An accident occurp in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the 'Workmen's Compensation Act' when it takes place within the
period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably
be, and while he is fulfilling the duties of his employment, or is engaged in
doing something incidental to it."14 Though not pertinent to the case at
hand, it may be added that the "period of employment" includes a reasonable time before and after the exact working hours, while the employee
is on the employer's premises.' 5 The definition of an "occupational disease"
and, in fact, the term itself, includes the element that the disease was contracted during the period and at the place of the employee's occupation, and
the Buenker case conceded that Buenker's "accident" occurred in the course
of the employment.
Indiana cases decided more nearly in accord with the views here expressed are the following: in 193116 compensation was allowed where the
injury was shown to have resulted from continued exposure for seven years
to excessive heat in a steel mill, another case 17 affirming an award to claimant where the decedent's death resulted from the continued inhalation of
noxious gas arising from molten metal, another case's affirming an award
to claimants where the death resulted from the inhalation of gas from a
tar tank where his duty called him to work for several hours; in another
an award of compensation was affirmed'9 where the claimant had been a
carpenter for his employer and had developed "brusitis" (housemaid's
knee), because of the position he was forced to assume for so long a time
in order to discharge his duties of scraping and polishing the floors.
In the light of the above discussion, it seems to the writer that the
Buenker ease was wrongly decided and that, regarding the purpose of the
Legislature which passed the "Workmen's Compensation Act," and the
terms of the aforesaid Act, as construed by our courts, the case falls fairly
within its province as being compensable.
However, if our courts feel they can not, by a reasonable interpretation
of our Act, bring such cases within its provisions, it is time for a legislative
extension of the scope of the Act so as to include them and thereby remedy
the economic and social problem which modern industrialism has forced
upon us-namely, the problem of who shall make pecuniary recompense for
the the toll of suffering and death which our industrialism is continually
levying upon the civilized world. Wisconsin, in 1919, amended their "Workmen's Compensation Act," expressly including occupational diseases as
compensable. Massachusetts makes occupational diseases compensable un14
jeffries et aL. v. Pitman-Moore Co. et al. (1925),
E. 919.
'5 Jeffries et al. v. Pitman-Moore Co. et al. (1925),

E. 919.
26Chapman Price Steel Co. v. Bertel8 et al. (1931),
E.

76.
17 General American, etc., Corporationv.

83 Ind. App. 159, 147 N.
83 Ind. App. 159, 147 N.
92 Ind. App. 634, 177 N.

Weirick et al. (1921), 77 Ind. App. 242,
133 N. E. 391.
1 Steel & Tube Co. of America et al. -v. Bukovao et al. (1923), 81 Ind. App. 219,
141 N. E. 643.
1"Standard Cabinet Co. v. Landgrave (1921), 76 Ind. App. 593, 132 N. E. 661.
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der their Act. The English Act on the subject, from which our own was
originally drafted, has been amended so as to specifically include occupational disease as compensable. This indicates the trend in accordance with
modern doctrines of humanity. The necessity for compensation in the case
of occupational disease is apparent. There is no reason why industry should
not bear the burden of compensating for the loss which the industry has occasioned and it should not bear the burden of compensating for the loss
which the industry has occasioned and it should not be able to throw off
this just burden because the injured employee can not point to some unusual
occurrence causing his disability. The pain and suffering occasioned by an
occupational disease are, in many cases, much greater and of a more permanent character than that arising from some unusual occurrence and it
seems a monstrous injustice that one is compensable while the other is not.
G. S. J.

